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COMMENT 
PUBLIC CONCERN - A 
"NEWSWORTHY" EXCEPTION TO 
THE GRANT OF PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTIONS IN TRADE 
SECRET CASES 
INTRODUCTION 
Apple iPods are the apple of everyone's eyes. The spectacular 
success of the iPod has spawned web sites devoted solely to Apple 
products and supporting software. 1 These web sites provide all the 
information that Apple neophytes and dedicated Apple geeks need? 
However, in recent times, these websites that are a source for all things 
Apple, have locked horns with the company over certain articles written 
before the release of new products.3 
The timing of the release and the features of the products are often 
1 See, e.g., ThinkSecret, http://www.thinksecret.com. The Mac Observer, 
http://www.themacobserver.com, O'Grady's Power Page, http://www.powerpage.com, 
MacRumors.com, http://www.macrumors.com. The iPod Observer, 
http://www.theipodobserver.com, MacBytes.com, http://www.macbytes.com (last visited Oct. 28, 
2(05). These websites publish articles primarily on the topic of Apple computers and products. They 
also publish articles about non-Apple products designed to interoperate with Apple products. 
2 1d. 
3 See Complaint, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Does, No. 1-04-CV-032178 (Santa Clara County 
Superior Court filed on Dec. 23, 2004), available at 
http://www.eff.org/Censorship/Apple_v _Does/Complaint.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2005) 
[hereinafter Apple Does, Complaint]; Complaint for Trade Secret Misappropriation, Tortious 
Interference with Contract and Breach of Contract Apple Computer, Inc. v. Nick dePlume, et. ai, No. 
I-OS-CV -033341 (Santa Clara County Superior Court filed on Jan 4, 2005), available at 
http://www.homepage.mac.com/jharrelllApple%20v.%20dePlume.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2005) 
[hereinafter ThinkSecret, Complaint]. 
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carefully guarded trade secrets.4 Apple's strategy is to maximize the 
publicity of new products without denting the demand for the older 
versions.5 Although not as significant as a Time magazine cover, these 
websites playa major role in popularizing Apple's products.6 However, 
these web sites struck a dissonant tune with Apple by prematurely posting 
future product information.7 Consequently, Apple filed a lawsuit against 
these websites for misappropriation of its trade secrets.8 
Before the advent of the Internet, trade secret holders such as Apple 
were not pressured to pursue third party publishers9 because of the 
publishers' practical inability to destroy the trade secret. 10 The 
publication was constrained by the limitations of the medium of 
publication, which did not have the reach or the speed of the Internet. ll 
Moreover, competitors often have the same interest in preserving the 
secrecy of a trade secret as the original holder of the information. 12 
Hence, mass dissemination by another was not a realistic threat. 13 
In general, a trade secret loses all protection when it is no longer a 
secret or it becomes generally known. 14 Therefore, the Internet has 
multiplied the risk of loss of a trade secret. 15 Third party publishers now 
4 See Apple Does, Complaint at 3; ThinkSecret, Complaint at 5. 
5 See ThinkSecret, Complaint at 6. 
6 See Defendant the dePlume Organizations LLC's Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Support of Special Motion to Strike Complaint Pursuant to California Anti-SLAPP Statute, Apple 
Computer, Inc. v. Nick deplume, et. ai, No. 1-05-CV-033341 (Santa Clara County Superior Court 
filed on March 4, 2005), available at http://www.thinksecret.com/filings/antislapmemorandum.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2005) [hereinafter ThinkSecret, Anti-SlAPP Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities] ThinkSecret delivers approximately 2.5 million page views a month and publishes on an 
average 13 articles a month. ThinkSecret, Anti-SlAPP Memorandum of Points and Authorities, 
supra note 5, at 2. 
7 See Apple Does, Complaint, supra note 3, at I; ThinkSecret, Complaint, supra note 3, at 2. 
8 See id. 
9 See Eugene Volokh, Essay: Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts 
after Eldred, Liquamart, and Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 697, 739 (2003). 
10 See David Greene, Trade Secrets, the First Amendment and the Challenges of the Internet 
Age, 23 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L. J. 537, 556 (2001) 
II [d. 
12 See Pamela Samuelson, Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the First 
Amendment, (Mar. 23, 2003) (unpublished "manuscript", available at: 
http:/www.sims.berkeley.edu/-pamlpapersITS%201st%20A%203%d20dr.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 
2005.) 
13 Id. 
14 See generally Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (E.D. Va. 1995) 
(holding that trade secret loses all protection when it is published on the Internet unless the 
publication was an obscure site with limited viewers); See also Bruce T. Atkins, Note, Trade Secrets 
in the Information Age: Can Trade Secret Law Survive the Internet?, 1996 U. TIl. L. Rev. liS 1, 1152 
(1996). 
15 See Bruce T. Atkins, Note, Trade Secrets in the Information Age: Can Trade Secret Law 
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have the power to instantaneously disseminate the information globally 
and destroy a trade secret. 16 In addition, trade secret owners have to deal 
with a new class of misappropriators - websites and web users. I? 
Trade secret law permits trade secret holders to seek injunctions and 
damages against misappropriators. 18 The challenges posed by the 
Internet may justify imposing injunctions on publication of trade secrets 
to protect investment in research and development, as in Apple's case. 19 
However, injunctions are a form of prior restraint.20 When granted 
against third party publishers who have no obligation to keep the 
information secret, injunctions prohibiting publication violate these 
publishers' First Amendment rightS?1 In addition, injunctions enable the 
trade secret holder to suppress information affecting the welfare of the 
public, under the guise of trade secrets.22 
The public has no legal right to access the trade secret under any 
circumstances because disclosure of a trade secret destroys its value. 23 
But, injunctions against third party disclosures of trade secrets adversely 
affect the welfare of the public by blocking a source of information and 
thereby stifling comment, criticism, and discussion?4 Therefore, the 
economic interests of trade secret holders must be weighed against the 
public necessity for disclosure and the First Amendment rights of third 
Survive the Internet?, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1151, 1152 (1996). 
16 See Uf. at 1153. 
17 1d. 
18 CAL. Crv. CODE § 3426.2(a) (West 2005). Actual or threatened misappropriation may be 
enjoined. Id. 
19 See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Does, No. 1-04-CV -032178 (Superior Court Santa Clara 
County, March II, 2005) available at http://www.eff.orglCensorship/ 
Apple_v_Doesl20050311_apple_decision.pdf (last visited October 28, 2005) [hereinafter Judge 
Kleinberg, March II, 2005, Order after Hearing.] 
20 The clearest definition of prior restraint is an administrative system or judicial order that 
prevents speech from occurring. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 938 (Aspen Law & 
Business 2001). See also Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 549 (1993) (stating that the term 
prior restraint is used to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain 
communications when issued in advance of the time that such communication are to occur). 
21 See Volokh, supra note 9, at 741 (2003). 
22 1d. at 746. 
23 See, e.g. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. NetCom On-Line Comm'c Services, Inc., 923 FSupp. 
1231, 1254 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.Net, Inc., 901 FSupp 1519 (D. Colo. 
1995); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F Supp. 1362, 1368 (E.D. Va. 1995), DVD Copy Control 
Ass'n v. Bunner, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d 69, 84 (2003) (holding that disclosure of trade secret on the Internet 
destroyed its status as trade secret because the information became generally known due to 
publication). 
24 See generally David Greene, Trade Secrets, the First Amendment and the Challenges of 
the Internet Age, 23 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L. J. 537 (2001) (arguing that the public will be served 
by affirming the publisher's First Amendment right, not restricting them even when they post trade 
secrets on the Internet). 
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party publishers to publish the information. 
Part I of this Comment provides a brief description of various 
provisions of California's trade secret law, the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act ("UTSA,,)?5 Part II analyzes the various categories of trade secret 
users who may become liable for unauthorized publication of a trade 
secret.26 Part ill examines the distinct approaches of the United States 
Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court in granting preliminary 
injunctions against third party publication of confidential information.27 
Part IV identifies the features of a newsworthy- public-concern exception 
to the grant of preliminary injunctions against third party publishers in 
trade secret cases?8 Part V provides justification for the recognition of a 
newsworthy- public-concern exception.29 Finally, this Comment 
concludes that in cases involving third party publication of information 
that would be prima facie trade secrets, courts should be more 
circumspect in granting preliminary injunctions when the information is 
newsworthy and relates to a matter of public concem.30 
I. BACKGROUND 
UTSA defines trade secret as "information, including a formula, 
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, 
that: (1) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from 
not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can 
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) is subject of 
efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its 
secrecy. ,,31 
Thus, under the UTSA, a trade secret encompasses anything of 
competitive value not generally known in a specific trade.32 The 
sweeping coverage of eligible subject matter is coupled with the right to 
25 See infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 37 -51 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 53 -128 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 129 -193 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 194-252 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 253-264 and accompanying text. 
31 CAL.CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West 2005). The National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Trade Secrets Act in 1979. See Atkins, supra note 15, at 
1157 (1996). Rather than changing the trade secret law, the UTSA drafters intended to codify 
existing standards and to promote uniformity in trade secret misappropriation standards. [d. See 
also Cadence Design Systems, Inc. v. Avant! Corporation. 29 Cal.4th 215, 221 (2002). California 
has adopted without significant change the Uniform Trade Secrets. [d. [Henceforth all references to 
trade secret law imply UTSAj. 
32 See Atkins, supra note 15, at 1157 (1996). 
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keep the information secret indefinitely.33 In addition, the law provides 
for injunctions and damages in case of unauthorized publication of trade 
secrets.34 
The rationale for imposing injunctions and damages for the 
disclosure of, for instance, Apple's trade secrets is supported by core 
public policies - maintaining commercial morality, to encourage 
research by ensuring that innovators benefit from their inventions and 
investments, and to punish industrial espionage.35 But the efficacy of 
injunctions imposed against a third party publisher for disclosing such 
information must be examined in the light of First Amendment rights of 
publishers and public concem.36 
II. THE UTSA AND LIABILITY FOR DISCLOSURE OF TRADE SECRETS 
Under the UTSA, once information qualifies as a trade secret, the 
publisher is liable if she acquired the trade secret through "improper 
means.,,3? "Improper means" include breach of contract, violation of a 
confidential relationship, theft, bribery, misrepresentation and other 
wrongs. 38 
In general, the trade secret holder can proceed against three 
categories of misappropriators.39 The first category includes employees 
33 DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 338, 350 (2002). C/, Bonnie L. Schriefer, 
Comment, "Yelling Fire" and Hacking: Why the First Amendment Does Not Permit Distributing 
Decryption Technology, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 2283, 2327 (2003). 
34 CAL. Cry. CODE § 3426.2(a) (West 2005). 
35 See Ryan Lambrecht, Note, Trade Secrets and the Internet: What Remedies Exist for 
Disclosure in the Information Age? 18 Rev. Litig. 317,320-321 (1999). 
36 But see Volokh, supra note 9, at 740 (restricting publication of information such as a 
company's plan to release a dangerous product, while benefiting the company tends to harm the 
public at large). 
37 CAL.Cry. CODE § 3426.I(a) (West 2005). 
38 Reverse engineering or independent derivation alone shall not be considered improper 
means. CAL.Cry. CODE § 3426.I(a) (West 2005). See e.g., E.!. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. 
Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (CAS, 1970), cert. den. 400 U.S. 1024 (1970). Improper means 
could include otherwise lawful conduct which is improper under the circumstances; e.g., an airplane 
over flight used as aerial reconnaissance to determine the competitor's plant layout during 
construction of the plant. Id. 
39 See Lambrecht, supra note 35, at 323. See also, CAL. Cry. CODE §3426.1(b) (West 2005). 
"Misappropriation" means: (I) Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has 
reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or (2) Disclosure or use of a 
trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who: (A) Used improper 
means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or (B) At the time of disclosure or use, knew or had 
reason to know that his or her knowledge of the trade secret was: (i) Derived from or through a 
person who had utilized improper means to acquire it; (ii) Acquired under circumstances giving rise 
to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (iii) Derived from or through a person who owed 
a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (C) Before a material 
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bound by a duty of confidentiality arising from a contract.40 Employees 
may be held liable for misappropriation of trade secrets because they 
have contracted away their First Amendment rightS.41 An express or 
implied duty of confidentiality can be enforced without offending the 
First Amendment.42 
The second category includes third party misappropriators such as 
competitors of trade secret holders.43 The UTSA imposes liability when 
they violate the standards of commercial ethics by hiring employees 
bound by confidential agreements or inducing them to breach such 
contracts.44 Imposing liability against the defendants in the first and 
second categories is justified by privity of contract, whereby publishers 
are entitled to waive their First Amendment rights by contract.45 
The third category includes entities such as newspapers and 
websites, not in privity with the trade secret holder.46 Journalistic 
websites, like newspapers, are not in competition with trade secret 
holders or bound by confidentiality agreements.47 However, such third 
parties may be liable if they knew or had reason to know at the time of 
publication that the informant had acquired the information illegally.48 
The grant of injunctions against this category of publishers is 
troublesome in the light of the First Amendment.49 The United States 
Supreme Court refused to grant injunctions against the third party 
change of his or her position, knew or had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that 
knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake. [d. 
40 See Lambrecht, supra note 35, at 323. 
41 See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 (1980). The Court enforced a voluntary 
confidentially agreement against CIA agent who had undertaken not to publish any material until he 
had obtained the approval of the CIA. [d. Despite the agreement he published a critical book about 
the CIA activities in South Viet Nam. The Court enforced the confidentiality agreement. [d. 
42 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. 501 U.S. 663, 669-670 (1991), Newspaper's right to 
publish limited by confidentiality agreement enforceable under state contract law. [d. See also 
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984), Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 
(1980) (involving the enforcement of confidentiality agreements). 
43 See Lambrecht, supra note 35, at 323. See also Microsoft Corp. v. Dr. Kai-Fu Lee and 
Google Inc., No. 052235616SEA (King County Superior Court), available at 
http://www.groklaw.netJarticIebasic.php?story=20050907054350872 (last visited Oct. 28, 2005) 
(Microsoft filed a lawsuit against Google for hiring its senior executive in China, to head Google's 
China operations). 
44 Lambrecht, supra note 35, at 323. 
45 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. 501 U.S. 663, 669-670 (1991); Seattle Times Co. v. 
Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507,511-513 (1980). 
46 See Robert Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 Cal. 
L. Rev. 241, 271(1998). 
47 See Volokh, supra note 9, at 741 (2003). 
48 CAL. CIY. CODE §3426.1(b) (West 2005). 
49 See Volokh, supra note 9, at 741-742. 
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publishers who knew or had reason to know that the information was 
illegally acquired.5o But the California Supreme Court held that 
preliminary injunctions against publication by such third parties did not 
violate the First Amendment.51 
III. CONFLICT BETWEEN TRADE SECRET LAW AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
Trade secret law is antithetical to free speech due to its enforced 
secrecy.52 The UTSA is similar to other forms of intellectual property 
protection in terms of encouraging innovation and protecting investments 
in research and development of new technology. 53 However, unlike 
other forms of intellectual property protection such as copyright, the 
UTSA makes little accommodation for the First Amendment rights of the 
pUblic.54 
With the growth of the Internet, disclosures of trade secrets are 
increasing.55 This has further accentuated the tension between trade 
secret law and the First Amendment.56 In resolving this conflict, the 
California Supreme Court's approach in DVD Copy Control Association 
v. Bunner57 ("DVDCCA "), diverges from the United States Supreme 
Court's approach in New York Times v. United Sates58 ("Pentagon 
Papers") and Bartnicki v. Vopper ("Bartnicki ,,).59 The California 
Supreme Court favored the economic interests of the trade secret holders 
in contrast to the United States Supreme Court's decisions upholding the 
50 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 - 724 (1971); Bartnicki v. 
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528-529 (2001). 
51 See DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d at 86. 
52 See Lambrecht, supra note 35, at 335. See also Whyte v. Schlage Lock Company, 101 
Cal.App.4th 1443, 1454 (2002). The test for trade secrets is whether the matter sought to be 
protected is information (I) which is valuable because it is unknown to others and, (2) which the 
owner has attempted to keep secret. ld. 
53 See Kewanee Oil Company v. Bicron Corporation, 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974). 
54 See DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 95 (2003). First, the UTSA lacks any 
constitutional foundation. ld at 96 (2003). Second, it contains no exception for 'fair use' or any 
other vehicle for safeguarding First Amendment concerns. ld. 
55 See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. NetCom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 923 
F.Supp. 1231(N.D. Cal. 1995); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.Net, Inc,. 901 F.Supp 1519 (D. Colo. 
1995); RTC v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Va. 1995), DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d 
69 (2003); Ford Motor Company. v. Lane 67 F.Supp.2d 745 (E.D.Mich.1999) (all involving third 
party publication of trade secrets on the Internet) 
56 See Lambrecht, supra note 35, at 335 (1999). 
57 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 69 (2003). 
58 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
59 532 U.S. 514 (200 I). 
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First Amendment rights of publishers.6o 
A. PENTAGON PAPERS AND THE PUBLICATION OF CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMATION 
Pentagon Papers is the seminal case establishing the right to 
publish confidential information.6' The Supreme Court's decision is 
especially relevant to the discussion of the validity of preliminary 
injunctions in trade secret misappropriation cases.62 
In Pentagon Papers, the Washington Post and the New York Times 
published excerpts from a top secret Defense Department dossier.63 The 
document was a classified study called "History of U.S. Decision-
Making Process on Viet Nam Policy" commonly known as "The 
Pentagon Papers.,,64 The newspapers acquired the documents from 
Daniel Ellsberg.65 Ellsberg stole the documents while working for the 
Rand Corporation.66 The government sought federal injunctions to 
preclude the publication of the documents because of the potential 
danger to national security.67 
The Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, refused to enjoin the 
newspapers from further publication of the articles.68 The majority held 
that any system of prior restraints bore a "heavy presumption against 
constitutional validity" and that the government carried "a heavy burden 
of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.,,69 
Justice Hugo Black and Justice William Douglas categorically 
stated that the "press must be free to publish news, whatever the source 
without censorship, injunctions or prior restraints.,,7o They concluded 
that open debate and discussion of public issues are vital to our national 
health.7l Justice William Brennan refused to grant the injunction, which 
60 See DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d 69 (2003). Cj. New York Times Co. v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001 (upholding the Frist 
Amendment rights of third party publishers of confidential information). 
61 See Greene, supra note 10, at 540. 
62 [d. 




67 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 714. 
68 [d. Among six judges who voted against a prior restraint, Justices Black and Douglas 
concurred in one another's opinion, as did Justices White and Stewart as to their opinions. [d. 
Justice Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion which Justices Burger and Blackmun joined. [d. 
69 New York Times Co. v United States, 403 U.S. at 714. 
70 See id. at 714-24. See also Samuelson, supra note 12. 
71 New. York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 724. 
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was "predicated upon surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences 
may result."n He recognized, however, that there is a single extremely 
narrow class of cases in which prior restraints are permitted.73 
According to Justice Brennan, only when the nation was at war and the 
proposed publication would obstruct war effort, could prior restraints be 
. d 74 Impose. 
Justices Byron White and Potter Stewart, while admitting that the 
documents could cause substantial damage to public interest, refused to 
grant the injunction because the Government failed to meet its heavy 
burden of persuading the court that the injunction was warranted under 
the circumstances.75 However, the dissenters, Chief Justice William 
Burger and Justice John Harlan, pointed out that the newspapers knew at 
the time of publishing the Pentagon Papers that the documents were 
stolen.76 Nevertheless, the Pentagon Papers Court stated that 
preliminary injunctions should be disfavored.77 
The decision is significant, since it supports the recognition of broad 
First Amendment rights for third party publishers of trade secrets.78 The 
Pentagon Papers, like trade secrets, were confidential and the newspapers 
did not participate in the initial illegal acquisition, but knew or had 
reason to know that Ellsberg had obtained them through improper 
means.79 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that preliminary injunctions 
should be disfavored.80 
Trade secret cases involving third party publications often involve 
similar facts. 8l The case is particularly significant for third party 
publishers of trade secrets such as websites, because it elevates their First 
Amendment right to publish confidential information over the economic 
interests of trade secret holders.82 
B. BARTNICKI AND THE RIGHT To PUBLISH CONFIDENTIAL 
NEWSWORTHY INFORM A TION 
The Supreme Court's decision 10 Bartnicki, further supports the 
72 !d. at 726. 
73 !d. 
74 !d. 
75 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 731. 
76 [d. at 749. 
77 [d. at 713. 
78 See Samuelson, supra note 12. 
79 See Samuelson, supra note 12. 
80 New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 713. 
81 See Samuelson, supra note 12. 
82 [d. 
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rights of third party publishers of confidential information.83 In 
Bartnicki, the Court refused to grant damages for publication of 
confidential information obtained in violation of a federal wiretap law. 84 
An unidentified person illegally intercepted and recorded a cell phone 
conversation between a union negotiator and the union president 
discussing the status of collective bargaining negotiations that had 
received a "lot of media attention.,,85 
Defendant Vopper, a radio commentator, received a tape of the 
intercepted conversation from an anonymous source.86 He broadcasted a 
portion of the conversation on radio.87 The conversation revealed that 
the union negotiator and president were plotting to blow the front 
porches off the houses of persons who opposed the union.88 
The Supreme Court held that the application of the wiretap statute 
to defendant Vopper violated the First Amendment, although he had 
reason to know that the conversation was illegally taped.89 The Court 
noted that the government had a strong interest in enforcing the law that 
preserves the privacy of communications.9o Nevertheless, the Court 
concluded that "[t]he enforcement of the [statutes at issue] implicates the 
core purposes of the First Amendment because it imposes sanctions on 
the publication of truthful information of public concern. ,.9l Thus, the 
Court held that "privacy concerns have to give way when balanced 
against the interest in publishing matters of public importance.,,92 
The Supreme Court's decisions in Pentagon Papers and Bartnicki 
have a limited impact on trade secret cases because (1) the UTSA 
expressly authorizes the grant of preliminary injunctions in trade secret 
misappropriation cases, but Pentagon Papers did not address the effect 
of such a statute, 93 and (2) in Bartnicki, the Supreme Court itself 
declined to extend its holding to "disclosures of trade secrets or domestic 
gossip or other information of purely private concern.,,94 




87 1d. at 519. 
88 1d. 
89 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. at 533. 
90 [d. at 532. 
91 [d. at 533. 
92 Id. at 534. 
93 See Samuelson, supra note 12. [I]mpact of Pentagon Papers on trade secret cases is 
limited by the lack of a majority opinion and the lack of legislative authority for enjoining the press 
from publishing confidential information. 
94 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533. 
10
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol36/iss2/5
2006] PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS & TRADE SECRETS 229 
C. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT'S ApPROACH To THIRD PARTY 
PUBLICATION OF TRADE SECRETS 
The California Supreme Court's decision in DVD Copy Control 
Association v. Bunner ("DVDCCA") examined the conflict between the 
First Amendment rights of third party publishers and the economic 
interests of the trade secret holders.95 The court placed the economic 
interests of the trade secret holders above the First Amendment rights of 
third party publishers and held that the preliminary injunctions were 
justified in protecting the economic interests of trade secret holders.96 
DVDCCA held the trade secret rights in the Content Scramble 
System (CSS), an encryption program, used to protect DVD movies. 97 
DVDCCA's licensees were required to install CSS in their systems, 
undertake various security measures to ensure that CSS remained secret, 
and include in end-user licenses provisions that forbid end-users from 
reverse-engineering CSS.98 Notwithstanding these efforts to keep CSS 
secret, a teenager named Jon Johansen allegedly reverse engineered CSS 
in Norway.99 Johansen wrote a program, DeCSS, that bypassed CSS and 
posted the DeCSS on the Internet. lOo In late October 1999, this program 
was the subject of intense discussion at various Internet sites. 101 
Numerous participants, including Andrew Bunner, decided to post this 
program on their websites. 102 
After Bunner and others ignored cease-and-desist letters, DVDCCA 
sued in California state court.103 DVDCCA charged Bunner, twenty 
other named individuals, and five hundred John Doe defendants, with 
trade secrecy misappropriation on the ground that Bunner and the other 
defendants knew or should have known that DeCSS embodied or was 
substantially derived from stolen trade secrets. 104 The trial court issued a 
preliminary injunction restraining the defendants from posting or 
otherwise disclosing the DeCSS program and any other information 
95 DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 75 (2003). See also, Samuelson, 
supra note 12. 




100 Id. at 76. 
101 ld. 
102 DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 76. See also Samuelson. supra note 
12. They posted this program as part of a widespread protest against the motion picture industry's 
efforts to prevent dissemination of this program. Id. 
103 DVD Copy Control Ass 'n, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 78. 
104 DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 338, 340. 
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derived from DVDCCA's proprietary information. lOS 
On appeal, the California Supreme Court assumed as true the trial 
court's findings in support of the preliminary injunction.106 The court 
assumed that - (1) DVDCCA would prevail on its claims (2) DVDCCA 
would suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief and, (3) The 
injunction would cause minimal harm to Bunner.107 
The court found that the preliminary injunction was content 
neutral108 and hence, not a prior restraint, because prior restraints must be 
content-based. 109 The court conceded that DeCSS, although computer 
code, was expression and therefore protected speech. 110 The court, after 
claiming to extend First Amendment protection to computer code, only 
considered whether the UTSA was engaged in viewpoint-based 
restriction. III Once the court concluded the UTSA was not suppressing a 
particular viewpoint, it showed no concern with whether the regulation 
was nevertheless a content-based restriction. 112 It simply refused to look 
at the nature of what was being suppressed by the UTSA, and in the 
name of protecting property rights adopted intermediate scrutiny. 113 
Moreover, the court failed to consider that even if the UTSA is content 
neutral, a specific preliminary injunction issued under the UTSA is not 
105 Id. 
106 DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 79. 
107/d. 
108 See Sable Communications of Cal ifomi a, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). The first 
step in the court's First Amendment analysis involves a determination by the court of whether the 
restriction on expression is content based. Id. See also Liam Seamus O'Melinn, The New Software 
Jurisprudence and the Faltering First Amendment, 6 Vand. J. Ent. L. & Prac. 310, 318 (2004.) 
Content based restrictions prohibit expression the basis of subject matter, and at their broadest they 
prohibit discussion of an issue altogether. Id. Viewpoint based restrictions, while also content based, 
and prohibit expression of one viewpoint on a subject while allowing another. /d. Both content based 
and view point based are subject to the highest level of scrutiny - strict scrutiny. Id. If a measure is 
deemed not to be content based or is deemed to be content neutral, then the restriction will usually 
be adjudicated under a lower less exacting level of scrutiny-intermediate scrutiny. Id. Strict scrutiny 
requires the government to establish it has a compelling interest in the restriction and it has adopted 
means narrowly tailored to meet that object. Intermediate scrutiny requires that the government's 
interest be substantial and the restriction not burden more speech than necessary. Id. 
109 DVD Copy Control Ass 'n, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 80. 
110 Id. "Computer code 'is an expressive means for the exchange of information ... we join 
the other courts that have concluded that computer code, and computer programs constructed from 
code can merit First Amendment protection.'" [d. 
III Liam Seamus O'Melinn, The New Software Jurisprudence and the Faltering First 
Amendment, 6 Vand. J. Ent. L. & Prac. 310, 318 (2004). The court actually applied an even less 
exacting test than intermediate level - something on the order of rational basis, in which any burden 
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content neutral. 114 
Applying intermediate scrutiny, the court concluded that the 
government had a significant interest in protecting the investment of 
trade secret holders in developing new and innovative products. 115 
Therefore, third party publishers' First Amendment rights must give way 
to the government's interests served by the preliminary injunction. I 16 
In reaching its conclusion, the court rejected several decisions 
holding that preliminary injunctions were unconstitutional even when the 
publication involved a trade secret. I 17 The court reasoned that 
DVDCCA's trade secrets in the CSS technology in the form of computer 
code conveyed only technical information (emphasis in original). I 18 The 
information was of interest to only a small niche group of Linux users 
and not the general pUblic. 119 Although, the computer code constituted 
expressive content, the court found that, in posting the information, 
Bunner did not intend to participate in any public debate or comment on 
any public issue.l20 Consequently, the information addressed matters of 
purely private concern. 121 
The court also concluded that the computer code was not 
newsworthy because there was no logical nexus between the trade secret 
the computer code represented, and public interest. 122 It determined that 
DVDCCA's trade secrets may have some link to a public issue.123 
However, this fact was insufficient for creating a legitimate public 
interest in their disclosure. 124 On balance, the court found that the 
government interest in protecting the property rights of the trade secret 
114 See Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe. 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (holding that a prior 
restraint comes with a " 'heavy presumption' against its constitutional validity. "). 
115 DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 83. 
116 [d. at 87. 
117 !d. See Oregon ex rei. Sports Mgmt. News v. Nachtigal, 921 P.2d 1304 (1996). Adidas 
had persuaded a lower court to issue the injunction to prevent Sports Management News from 
publishing reports about a new shoe design which Adidas claimed as a trade secret. !d. However, 
the Oregon Supreme Court overturned a preliminary injunction. See also Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 
F.Supp.2d 745 (1999).(E.D.Mich.1999). Ford Motor Co. lost a motion for a preliminary injunction 
on First Amendment grounds against Internet postings about unreleased new automobile designs that 
Ford claimed as trade secrets. [d. However, the California Supreme Court found these decisions 
inapplicable. 




J22 DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 86. 
123 !d. at 79. 
124 [d. 
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holder outweighed Bunner's interest in publication.125 
The court did leave open the possibility for a narrow exception to 
grant of preliminary injunctions against third party publishers. 126 The 
court's decision seems to suggest that the court would not have granted 
the injunction if the information published related to a matter of public 
concern and was newsworthy.127 Therefore, if Bunner's posting (1) had 
mass appeal; (2) contributed to any public debate or commented on any 
public issue, and (3) was newsworthy, then the court may not have 
granted the injunction. 128 
IV. THE FEATURES OF A "NEWSWORTHY PUBLIC CONCERN 
EXCEPTION" To THE GRANT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS 
The issue of third party pUblication of trade secrets has also arisen 
in the context of Apple's lawsuits against websites and their operators. 129 
Apple's lawsuits provide an opportunity to examine the factors for an 
exception to the grant of preliminary injunctions. As Apple's lawsuits 
demonstrate, newsworthiness or mass appeal of a piece of information is 
necessary but not sufficient for an exception to the grant of preliminary 
injunctions. 130 The information must also affect a matter of public 
concern, namely the health, safety, or well being of the people at large. 131 
Therefore, when a trade secret stimulates the interest or curiosity of the 
public and affects public concern, then preliminary injunctions should 
not be imposed on the third party publishers of the information.132 The 
125 Id. at 87. 
126 See id. at 86. 
127 1d. 
128 DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 86. See also DVD Copy Control 
Ass'n v. Bunner, to Cal.Rptr.3d 185 (2004). The California Supreme remanded the case to the Court 
of Appeal which struck down the injunction as an unconstitutional prior restraint. /d. at 195. The 
Court of Appeal concluded that the DeCSS had lost its status as a trade secret prior to the initiation 
of lawsuit. Id. In addition, defendant Bunner had only republished infonnation already available on 
other sites. Id. at 190. The Court of Appeal concluded that: (1) DVDCCA could not show that it 
would suffer irreparable hann before obtaining injunction; (2) DVDCCA did not show likelihood of 
prevailing on merits; and (3) DVDCCA failed to show irreparable hann if injunction were not 
issued. Id. at 192-96. Therefore, the Court of Appeal reversed the order granting preliminary 
injunction. Id. at 195. 
129 See, ThinkSecret, Complaint. See also Apple Does, Complaint. 
130 See Judge Kleinberg, March II, 2005, Order after Hearing supra note 19, at 12. 
131 1d. 
132 See generally Volokh, supra note 9 at 741 (imposing restrictions on third party 
publication of trade secrets which relate to matters of public concern is a violation of First 
Amendment). See also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling 
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 Stanford L. Rev. 1049, t071 
(2000) (suggesting a hot news exception as a solution to restrictions on First Amendment rights 
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existence of both factors, newsworthiness and public concern, would 
contribute to protecting the First Amendment rights of third party 
publishers and welfare of the public at large without indiscriminately 
. d 1D exposmg tra e secrets. 
A. ApPLE'S LAWSUITS AGAINST WEBSITES FOR PUBLICATION OF 
TRADE SECRETS 
Apple filed two lawsuits, both involving the third party disclosure 
of trade secrets on the Internet. 134 Apple filed a lawsuit against several 
unnamed defendants for posting an exact copy of a detailed drawing of 
"Asteroid" created by Apple. 135 The drawing was taken from a 
confidential set of slides clearly labeled "Apple-Need-to-Know 
Confidential.,,136 In addition, "technical specifications were copied 
verbatim from confidential slide set and posted on the Internet.,,137 
Apple subpoenaed three websites, Apple Insider, PowerPage and 
ThinkSecret, to produce their confidential sources.138 In permitting the 
discovery of confidential sources, the trial court held that trade secret law 
applies to everyone regardless of their status, title, or chosen 
profession. 139 The court also held that the compelling interest in 
protecting trade secrets outweighed any First Amendment rights of the 
websites. 14o As a result, the court concluded that verbatim posting of the 
information served no public interest and denied the protective order 
sought by the websites. 141 The trial court reasoned that "an interested 
public is not the same as public interest.,,142 
In another lawsuit against the website ThinkSecret, Apple sought 
preliminary and permanent injunctions and damages for the publication 
of its future product information. 143 ThinkSecret printed three articles 
about the headless iMAC and iWork office suite prior to the actual 
announcement to the public at the IMac Exhibition. l44 Although the 
based on information privacy.) 
133 See Volokh, supra note 9, at 745-46. 
134 See Apple Does. Complaint and ThinkSecret. Complaint. 
135 Judge Kleinberg. March 11, 2005, Order after Hearing, supra note 19. at 6. 
136 /d at 2-3. 
137 [d. 
138 [d. 
139 See id. at 8-9. 
140 See id. at 11-12. 
141/d. 
142 [d at 12. 
143 ThinkSecret. Complaint, supra note 3, at 18. 
144 [d. 
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website obtained the information from an anonymous source, Apple 
alleged that the information was obtained through improper means. 145 
Thus, Apple's second lawsuit also involved the third party publication of 
trade secrets!46 In all probability, the trial court's decision will be 
similar to its decision in Apple's first lawsuit. 147 
B. THE FEATURES OF A "NEWSWORTHY PUBLIC CONCERN 
EXCEPTION" 
The trial court in Apple's case stated that "an interested public is not 
the same as public interest.,,148 This statement warrants further 
discussion about the features of a "newsworthy public concern 
exception".149 First, the exception cannot be applied if the third party is 
also involved in the initial misappropriation of the trade secret. 150 Such a 
limitation on the application of the exception is necessary to ensure 
efficiency of the creative processes of trade secret holders. 151 Second, 
the information must be newsworthy.152 Finally, the information must 
affect the welfare of the general public. 153 Reliance on the 
newsworthiness of the information, without more, would be as harmful 
to the public as a policy of prohibiting disclosure in all situations.154 
1. Public-Concern - A Tort Law Analogy 
In applying the "newsworthy public concern exception" exception 
the courts would benefit from tort law cases where a "public necessity" 
exception is used to resolve the conflict between the property rights of 
private parties and welfare of the pUblic. 155 
145 [d. 
146 [d. 
147 See John Gruber, On The Credibility of the New York Times, available at: 
hnp:/ldaringfireball.net/2005/03/new_york_times (last visited Oct. 28, 2005) 
148 See Judge Kleinberg, March 11, 2005, Order after Hearing, supra note 19, at 12. 
149 [d. 
150 See Samuelson, supra note 12. 
151 See id. 
152 See DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 87. 
153 See Volokh, supra note 132 at 741. 
154 See. Judge Kleinberg, March ]], 2005, Order after Hearing, supra note 19, at 11-12. 
155 See Bone, supra note 46, at 271. Not only is trade secret law classified with other 
intellectual property laws, but trade secrets themselves are treated as property capable of free 
transfer and devise. [d. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25-28 (1987) (finding that 
confidential information is "property" for purposes of a criminal conviction under the federal mail 
and wire fraud statute); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-04 (1984) (holding that 
trade secrets are "property" for purposes of the Constitution's prohibition against takings without just 
16
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Tort law recognizes a public-concern exception even where the 
interests of a private party are significantly affected. 156 In Surroco v. 
Geary, the California Supreme Court recognized the concept of "public 
necessity." 157 The plaintiff's house was blown up to prevent the spread 
of fire that would have destroyed several other properties on the block. 158 
In refusing to award damages the court held that "the individual rights of 
property give way to the higher laws of impending necessity.,,159 
Similarly, in defamation cases the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a 
public concern exception to the common law rule not requiring the 
private plaintiff to show actual malice. l60 The Court found that the First 
Amendment requires a higher burden of proof when the plaintiff seeks to 
enjoin the media defendant from publishing information of public 
concem. 161 Likewise, the individual property rights of trade secret 
holders must give way to the greater need of the public in certain 
situations. 
2. Third Party Involvement In The Initial Misappropriation Of The 
Trade Secret Vitiates The Application Of The Exception 
As stated, the UTSA permits injunctions and damages against third 
party publishers if they knew or had reason to know that the information 
was obtained illegally.162 In DVDCCA, the California Supreme Court 
equated such publishers to receivers of stolen property.163 The rationale 
is to prevent the "laundering" of misappropriated information. l64 If a 
third party were not also held liable, a misappropriator would attempt to 
publicize the information by disclosing it to third parties. 165 Once the 
information is widely disclosed, the information is no longer a trade 
secret and the misappropriator could thus insulate himself from 
compensation); See also Surroco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69 (1853) (establishing the doctrine of public 
necessity). 
156 See Surroco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69 (1853). 
157 [d. at 73. 
158 [d. at 70. 
159 [d. at 73. 
160 See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (l964)(holding that in cases 
involving matters of public concern, the private plaintiff must prove actual malice by a clear and 
convincing evidence to succeed.) 
161/d. 
162 CAL. CIv. CODE §3426.I(b) (West 2(05). 
163 DVD Copy Control Assn. v. Bunner, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 69, 86 (2003). 
164 Samuelson, supra note 12. 
165 [d. 
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liability. 166 If the third party were also held liable, the incentive to 
rapidly disseminate the trade secret is abated. 167 
In Bartnicki,168 as in Pentagon Papers l69 before it, the United States 
Supreme Court refused to hold the third party publisher liable, even 
though the publisher knew or had reason to know that the information 
was obtained illegally.l70 In DVDCCA, the California Supreme Court 
erroneously assumed that website operator Bunner knew or had reason to 
know that the information was a trade secret. 171 Still, the court correctly 
focused its main inquiry on the constitutionality of the preliminary 
injunction.172 The court considered whether there was sufficient public 
interest in publication so as to preclude the preliminary injunction.173 
Like Bartnicki,174 D VDCCA does not hold a third party publisher liable 
simply because the publisher knew or had reason to know that the 
information was a result of a breach of duty. 175 So long as the third party 
publisher was not involved in initial misappropriation, the fact that the 
publisher knew or had reason to know should not restrict the application 
of the newsworthy- public-concern exception. 176 
3. Information With A Logical Nexus To Public Interest Is Newsworthy 
In DVDCCA, the court also stated that "the publication of private 
information is only newsworthy if there is a logical nexus between the 
information and a matter of legitimate public interest.,,177 In addition to 
the requirement that the information not be "generally known," which 
arguably makes it newsworthy, the content must also involve an issue of 
public concern. 178 
What constitutes "public concern" is difficult to define. 179 In 
166/d. 
167 [d. 
168 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 515 (2001). 
169 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) 
170 See supra notes 61-92 and accompanying text. 
171 See DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 79; see also DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. 
Bunner, 116 Cal. App.4th 241 (2004) (On remand. the Court of Appeal found that since CSS code 
was widely available even before Bunner published it on his website, he was not guilty of 
misappropriating the DVDCCA's trade secret.) 
172 DVD Copy Control Ass 'n, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d at 79. 
173 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
174 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at SIS. 
175 See supra note 128 and accompanying text 
176 See Volokh, supra note 132, at 743. 
177 DVD Copy Control Ass 'n, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 84. 
178 See Volokh, supra note 132, at 741. 
179 See Volokh, supra note 9, at 743. 
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Apple's lawsuit against ThinkSecret, the posting of infonnation 
concerning Apple's new products did not meet the exception. 180 
Although infonnation about new products was newsworthy, it did not 
meet the public concern element. 181 The aim of the posting was to satisfy 
the curiosity of the public concerning new products rather than to 
contribute to a discussion of an issue of public importance,182 therefore, 
the "newsworthy public concern exception" would not apply. 
Likewise, in DVDCCA the court dismissed the publication of 
DeCSS as a matter of private concern of interest only to computer 
encryption enthusiasts. 183 However, the court's conception of what 
constitutes matters of public concern is flawed. 184 Characterizing trade 
secrets as relating to matters of "purely private concern" is erroneous. 185 
Trade secrets can often be matters of significant public concern to a 
company's employee, customers, neighbors, or regulators. 186 The court's 
dictum would lead to a ban on third party publication of trade secrets 
based on an unsupported assertion of their inherent "private concern" 
status. 187 
The court's notion of public concern would necessarily exclude 
scientific infonnation published in scientific journals.188 This 
infonnation would garner less protection because it is merely of private 
concern and would only appeal to a select group of computer 
scientists. 189 
The court would similarly hold that infonnation concerning a 
vaccine for AIDS or cancer that stems from a trade secret is not entitled 
to protection under a public concern exception, despite the tremendous 
public necessity for the infonnation, because the infonnation is technical 
and would appeal only to biologists. 190 
A determination of the public concern element clearly depends on 
the facts of each case and courts should not be too quick to dismiss 
product and technical infonnation as lacking public concern. 191 A 
discussion of purely scientific issues is of no less public concern than a 
ISO See supra notes 141-142 and accompanying text. 
lSI See Judge Kleinberg, March 11, 2005, Order after Hearing, supra note 19, at 11-12. 
IS2 'd. 
IS3 DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 86. 
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discussion of politics, because scientific and political issues are often 
interrelated. 192 Therefore, a balanced approach is important in the 
interest of equity because preliminary injunctions are pretrial relief and, 
if granted liberally, may morph into prior restraints. 193 
IV. RATIONALE FOR A "NEWSWORTHY PUBLIC CONCERN EXCEPTION" 
FOR THIRD PARTY PuBLICATION OF TRADE SECRETS 
The recognition of a "newsworthy public concern exception" to 
trade secret law is important for several reasons. Preliminary injunctions 
are granted before the trade secret holder can establish that the 
information is indeed a trade secret. 194 Consequently, the court in 
granting injunctions may be suppressing potentially protected speech 
based on "surmise and conjecture.,,195 Injunctions are an easy tool for 
trade secret holders who want to prevent certain negative information 
about their products from reaching the public. 196Through the devices of 
preliminary injunctions trade secret holders can suppress the views of 
third party publishers, throttle a source of information, and keep the 
public ignorant about information affecting their welfare. A 
newsworthy- public-concern exception is necessary to prevent trade 
secret holders from controlling the content and flow of certain 
information on the Internet. 
A. REDUCING THE CHILLING EFFECT OF TRADE SECRET LAW ON 
EXPRESSION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
Preliminary injunctions have a definite chilling effect on speech 
because they are granted before a full trial on the merits. 197 The special 
vice of a preliminary injunction is that it is a prior restraint and 
suppresses communication, either directly or indirectly, by inducing 
excessive caution in the speaker. 198 Consequently, potentially protected 
speech will be enjoined prior to adjudication on the merits of the 
192 1d. 
193 See supra note 108-109 and accompanying text. 
194 See generally Bone, supra note 46, at 271. (arguing that trade secret law is justified only 
when it protects pre-patent information). 
195 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
196 See CAL CIV. CODE § 3426.1 (West 2005). Senate Legislative Committee Comments, 
Added by Stats.1984, c. 1724, § I. Amended by Stats.1994, c. 1010 (S.B.2053), § 54. 
197 See DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d, 69, 93 (2003) (Moreno, J., 
concurring). 
198 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. The Pittsburg Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 
(1973). 
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publisher's First Amendment claims. 199 
Moreover, injunctions against publication of information 
concerning new products have the effect of keeping consumers in the 
dark about these new products and technologies?OO Information such as 
defects in the products, potential effects of using drugs, a comparison of 
new products to existing products, policies concerning the marketing of 
these products to particular groups of people such as children, warnings 
about negative effects, etc., are of significance to the public and should 
not be suppressed?OI 
Injunctions against third party publishers that provide the public 
with such information smother discussion, comment, criticism, and 
debate?02 Courts should not become accessories of big corporations that 
want to avoid bad publicity by controlling the product or technology 
information under the rubric of trade secret. In particular, small website 
publishers will be susceptible to corporations' demand to remove, or 
even refrain from posting the information?03 In considering 
corporations' pretrial requests to compel websites to remove any 
"offending" messages, courts should if possible avoid granting 
preliminary injunctions in favor of awarding damages after trial.204 
Apple, for instance routinely sends "cease-and-desist" letters to 
websites and their Internet Service Provider ("ISP") when they believe 
that certain proprietary information has been disclosed on the Internet. 205 
For example, in July 2000, MacInTouch published rumors regarding 
upcoming Apple products set to be announced at that summer's 
Macworld Expo in New York.206 Apple Legal sent a cease-and-desist 
199 Id. See also Lemley & Volokh, Free Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property 
Cases, 48 Duke L.J. 147, 158-164, 216-224 (1998) (arguing that an important purpose of prior 
restraint doctrine should be curtailing premature censorship of potentially protected speech through 
preliminary injunctions); Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role o/the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First 
Amendment Theory, 70 Va. L. Rev. 53, 87-88 (1984) (arguing that the prior restraint doctrine 
recognizes that interim equitable relief poses a particular danger to First Amendment rights.) 
200 See generally Volokh, supra note 9; Greene, supra note 10. 
201 See Volokh, supra note 9, at 746. 
202 See id. 
203 See John Gruber, Plugged Leaks, available at: 
http://daringfireball.netJ2005/07/plugged_leaks (last visited Oct. 28, 2005). 
204 See Greene, supra note 10. 
205 See supra note 203 and accompanying text. When a rumor site publishes screenshots of 
unreleased Apple software, Apple's lawyers send a friendly cease-and-desist letter: "Take down 
these images, and we'll call it even. " /d. These cease-and-desist letters are such a regular occurrence 
that they've turned into an unofficial gauge of accuracy - if a rumor is posted with screenshots of 
unreleased Apple software, and the site does not receive a letter from Apple Legal, then the images 
are widely regarded as fakes. Id. 
206 Id. 
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letter, demanding the site remove the information and also sent a letter to 
MacInTouch's ISP.207 The website complied with Apple's request solely 
to avoid the legal cost of fighting it.208 
Similarly, Apple sent several "cease-and-desist" letters to 
ThinkSecert before filing their lawsuit?09 The successful application of a 
preliminary injunction against ThinkSecret enables Apple to send a 
strong message to other such websites posting information about their 
products.2lO The effect is that websites, unwilling to pursue litigation, 
will comply merely because Apple claimed that the information was a 
trade secret.2l1 
Thus, trade secret holders have the power, inside and outside the 
courtroom, to control the content and flow of information concerning 
their product. A "newsworthy public concern exception" would 
significantly diminish the effect of such cease-and-desist letters and 
prevent trade secret holders from censoring content on the Internet. 
B. PREVENTING THE SUPPRESSION OF THE THIRD PARTY PUBLISHER'S 
VIEWPOINT 
In DVDCCA, the California Supreme Court concluded that the 
injunctive remedy granted under trade secret law is content neutral.212 
Generally, preliminary injunctions can suppress the viewpoint of third 
party publishers.213 Specifically, trade secret holders can constrain or 
eliminate information that would unpredictably affect the demand for 
their products, before actual release, through preliminary injunctions?14 
The injunctions thus enable corporations to shape information or its 
content in a most advantageous way at a most convenient time.215 While 
the trade secret holders' investments are protected, the interests of the 
public and third party publishers are compromised.216 
In DVDCCA, the court stated that the injunction would not hamper 
Bunner's ability to "discuss and debate" the issues in "an educational, 
scientific, philosophical and political context.,,217 However, technical 
207 [d. 
208/d. 
209 ThinkSecret, Complaint, supra note 3, at II. 
210 See Gruber, supra note 203. 
211/d. 
212 DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d 69, 88 (2003). 




217 DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 87. 
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information is often expressed in a particular format - in code, data, 
figures, and formulae. 218 An effective discussion would be hampered if 
the third party was precluded from using those forms of expressions to 
. 'd 219 communIcate 1 eas. 
A "newsworthy public concern exception" would help correct the 
imbalance favoring the rights of trade secret holders and, at the same 
time, preserve the right of the public to monitor an organization's 
practices, policies and the quality of their products and services,z20 
Arguably, publication of Apple's future product information failed 
to meet the public concern element.221 While the public was certainly 
"interested" in the information, the "interest" was mere curiosity.222 
Moreover, the disclosure did not affect the welfare of the public. 223 
On the other hand, publication of the negative effects of a drug 
suppressed by a trade secret holder would qualify for the "newsworthy 
public concern exception". Pharmaceutical companies often market 
drugs, with significant side effects, directly to consumers.224 For 
instance, during the recent Vioxx trials in Texas, it was revealed that 
Merck's executives knew that Vioxx increased the risk of cardiac arrests 
as early as 1997, but continued to aggressively market the drug as safe.225 
The public would benefit from information about the harmful 
effects of drugs or the illegal promotion of drugs for unauthorized 
uses,226 but, the UTSA and the FDA regulations enable drug companies 
to withhold information affecting the health of people under the guise of 
trade secrets.227 The expansive definition of "trade secrets" adopted by 
the UTSA extends protection to a plaintiff who has not yet had an 
218 Vo1okh, supra note 9 at 741. 
219 1d. 
220 !d. 
221 See Judge Kleinberg, March Il, 2005, Order after Hearing, supra note 124, at 11-12. 
222 !d. at 12. 
223 !d. at 13. 
224 See Marcia Angell, The Truth About Drug Companies, available at: 
http://www.nybooks.comlarticlesl17244#fn3 (last visited Sept. 17,2(05). 
225 See Anna W. Mathews & Barbara Martinez, Leaked Documents Show Merck Knew of 
Vioxx Dangers, available at: http://www.newstarget.comlOI613.html(lastvisitedNov.IS. 2005). 
226 !d. 
227 See Was Traci Johnson Driven to Suicide by Anti-Depressants? That's a Trade Secret, Say 
US Officials, THE INDEPENDENT (London), June 19, 2005, available at 
http://news.independent.co.ukluklhealth_medicallarticle226432.ece; But cf Protecting Trade Secrets 
and Other Intellectual Property in Drug and Medical Device Litigation, Rx for the Defense, Winter 
2004, Orrick Herrington and Sutcliffe available at LEXIS, News Library (arguing that such protection 
is necessary to foster investment in research and development and prevent competitors from 
plagiarizing technology.) 
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opportunity or acquired the means to put a trade secret to use.228 The 
definition includes information that has commercial value from a 
negative viewpoint, such as the results of lengthy and expensive research 
which proves that a certain process will not work and which could be of 
I . 229 great va ue to a competItor. 
Recognition of a "newsworthy public concern exception" is 
necessary in such situations because of the vital importance of the 
disclosure.23o While the disclosure may cause significant losses to the 
pharmaceutical company, the public's concern about the information 
outweighs the purely commercial interests in retaining the information as 
a trade secret. 231 
Even where the publication of proprietary information would cause 
significant loss to companies, courts have refused to enjoin publication 
of such information in traditional media when it relates to a matter of 
public concern.232 In CBS, Inc. v. Davis, the United States Supreme 
Court reversed a district court decision granting a preliminary injunction 
prohibiting CBS from airing video footage taken at the factory of Federal 
Beef Processors, Inc. 233 The district court granted the injunction because 
the tape disclosed the company's "confidential and proprietary practices 
and processes.,,234 In striking down the injunction, Justice Blackmun 
held that the transmission addressed a matter of public concern and the 
injunction would be an unconstitutional prior restraint.235 
The same standard set forth in CBS should apply to Apple's case 
against ThinkSecret. If the public's interest in Apple's new products is 
mere curiosity, then publication of the information that constitutes that 
trade secret should be properly enjoined, even though it is newsworthy. 
236 On the other hand, if the public concern is sufficiently great, then the 
court should apply the "newsworthy public concern exception" and deny 
the issuance of a preliminary injunction. 
228 CAL Cry. CODE § 3426.1 (West 2005). Senate Legislative Committee Comments. Added by 
Stats.1984, c. 1724, § I. Amended by Stats.1994, c. \0\0 (S.B.2053), § 54. 
229 1d. 
230 See Vo1okh, supra note 9, at 748. 
231 1d. 
232 See New York Times Co., 403 U.S. 713,714 (1971); see also Bartnicki v. Vopper. 532 U.S. 
514,515 (2001). 
233 CBS. Inc. v. Davis, 5\0 U.S. 1315, 1325 (1994). 
234 Id. 
235 1d. 
236 See Judge Kleinberg, March 11.2005. Order after Hearing. supra note 19, at 12. 
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C. PREVENTING CONCEALMENT OF INFORMATION AFFECTING PUBLIC 
CONCERN 
Article I of the U.S. Constitution explicitly grants Congress the 
power "to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing 
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their 
respective writings and discoveries." 237 Other forms of intellectual 
property rights such as patent and copyright expire after a definite period 
of time. 238 In addition, copyright law recognizes a "fair use 
exception.,,239 
In contrast, the UTSA lacks a constitutional foundation and fails to 
make any accommodation for the First Amendment rights of third party 
publishers?40 The law makes no exception for the disclosure of 
information under any circumstances?41 Furthermore, it permits the trade 
secret holder to keep the information secret indefinitely, thereby 
depriving the public from accessing the information forever.242 
The classic trade secret example is the formula for making Coca-
Cola.243 Critics of a public concern exception cite the losses that Coca-
Cola would sustain if its formula were disclosed,z44 In fact, Coca-Cola is 
a good example for the recognition of a newsworthy- public-concern 
exception. "The original Coca-Cola was a late-nineteenth-century 
concoction known as Pemberton's French Wine Coca, a mixture of 
237 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 8. 
238 Utility patents and plant patents expire 20 years from the date of filing of the earliest 
application subject to the payment of maintenance fees. 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pacldoclgenerallindex.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2006). Design 
patents last 14 years from the date of issuance. Trademarks expire 10 years after the registration with 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Id. Copyright terms vary from 28 to 120 years 
depending on the date of publication of the work. Id. 
239 The 'fair use' exception permits copying and use of a copyrighted work 'for purposes such 
as criticism. comment, news reporting, teaching ... scholarship, or research' under certain 
circumstances. 17 U.S.c. § 107. It 'offers a means of balancing the exclusive rights of a copyright 
holder with the public's interest in dissemination of information affecting areas of universal concern, 
such as art, science and industry. DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner 4 Cal. Rptr.3d 69, 96 (2003). 
Injunctions in copyright infringement cases have been upheld 'on the ground that First Amendment 
concerns are protected by and coextensive with the [Copyright Act's] fair use doctrine.' Id. 
240 DVD Copy Control Association v. Bunner, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 338, 349. 
241 DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 4 Cal. Rptr.3d at 96. 
242 DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 113 Cal. Rptr.2d at 350. 
243 See Atkins, supra note IS, at 1152. 
244 Id. A corporation suffers the same harm as individuals; in fact, corporations may have 
much more to lose than individuals. The damage to individuals is often temporary, whereas a 
corporation may suffer permanent damage from appropriation of its identity if its trade secret is lost 
on the Internet. Consider, for instance, the damage that Coca-Cola would suffer if its secret formula 
were published on the Internet and others were free to appropriate it. !d. 
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alcohol, the caffeine-rich kola nut, and coca, the raw ingredient of 
cocaine.,,245 Due to public pressure the cocaine content was dropped in 
1903?46 Despite the change in one of its essential ingredients, Coca-
Cola continued to thrive?47 
If the formula for Coca-Cola were never revealed, then the public 
would never have known that the drink contained cocaine and could 
never have forced Coca-Cola to remove the harmful ingredient. 
Therefore, the "newsworthy public concern exception" is necessary for 
formulating policies and passing laws to protect the public from harmful 
practices that companies would indulge in to maximize their profits. 
While information is eventually disclosed to the public under patent 
and copyright law, a trade secret keeps valuable information from the 
public for an indefinite period.248 For example, the UTSA enables an oil 
company that has developed an alternative source of energy to 
deliberately suppress that information to capitalize on its profits from oil 
and natural gas?49 If disclosed, the information would probably be of 
great benefit to the public?50 The company derives profit from keeping 
this information secret and the UTSA permits the company to conceal 
this information indefinitely, or until it decides the time is right to exploit 
the information.25I The UTSA also permits the company to seek 
injunctions against third party publishers who reveal this information to 
the pUblic.252 
In such situations, a "newsworthy public concern exception" would 
enable the public to force law makers to develop policies or provide 
subsidies for exploiting technology to ease the dependence on traditional 
fossil fuels. The absence of this exception benefits the trade secret 
holder at the cost of the society in general. Thus, the secrecy that benefits 
the holder engenders great social cost at the expense of others. A 
"newsworthy public concern exception" that allows the publication of 
trade secrets helps to diminish the negative effects of such secrecy. 




248 See supra notes 238-242 and accompanying text. 
249 See Volokh, supra note 9, at 747. 
250 1d. 
251 See CAL CIv. CODE § 3426.1 (West 2005). Senate Legislative Committee Comments. 
Added by Stats.1984, c. 1724, § I. Amended by Stats.1994, c. 1010 (S.B.2053), § 54. 
252 1d. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The "newsworthy public concern exception" is justified by the 
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open .... ,,253 The UTSA, 
however, inhibits this debate by adopting an expansive definition of trade 
secret, encompassing a wide range of information and permitting trade 
secret holders to keep information secret forever.254 Trade secret law 
also authorizes the issuance of preliminary injunctions for unauthorized 
disclosures of trade secrets.255 Preliminary injunctions issued after an 
abbreviated judicial inquiry further aggravate the inhibiting effect of 
trade secret law.256 
The application of these injunctions against third party publishers 
such as websites, are a violation of their First Amendment rights.257 The 
injunctions are not justified even when the third party publishers knew or 
had reason to know that the information was a trade secret because they 
are not in privity with the trade secret holder and owe no duty of 
secrecy.258 
A "newsworthy public concern exception" to the grant of 
preliminary injunctions against such third party publishers is necessary to 
protect their First Amendment rights?59 The exception is also necessary 
for the welfare of the general public because it brings to light negative 
information deliberately suppressed by a trade secret holder.26o A 
"newsworthy public concern exception" also enables the public to 
monitor the activities of companies and to develop policies for the 
greater good of society?61 
The cost of recognizing the exception would be borne by trade 
secret holders?62 To ensure that the interests of trade secret holders are 
not jeopardized, the exception must be applied only when a third party 
publisher was not complicit in the initial misappropriation.263 Moreover 
the exception may be applied only where the information published is 
253 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964). 
254 See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. 
255 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
256 See supra notes 194-196 and accompanying text. 
257 See supra note 39-51and accompanying text. 
258 See supra notes 52-92 and accompanying text. 
259 See supra note 197-211 and accompanying text. 
260 See supra note 237-252 and accompanying text. 
261 See supra note 212-236 and accompanying text. 
262 See supra notes 162-176 and accompanying text. 
263 See id. 
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both newsworthy and affects public concern?64 
Therefore a "newsworthy public concern exception" to the grant of 
preliminary injunctions against third party publishers of trade secrets is 
justified both by the publishers' right to publish and the public's need to 
know. 
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